{"id":755,"date":"2019-05-19T10:00:07","date_gmt":"2019-05-19T10:00:07","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/?p=755"},"modified":"2019-05-19T16:52:25","modified_gmt":"2019-05-19T16:52:25","slug":"what-the-forkgov-does-staying-together-tear-you-apart-even-more","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/what-the-forkgov-does-staying-together-tear-you-apart-even-more\/","title":{"rendered":"What the ForkGov! Does staying together tear you apart even more?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Fork-governance of cryptocurrencies and decentralised networks examined<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[Note: This text written in January 2019 follows on from \u201c<a rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fhackernoon.com%2Ftowards-an-analytical-discipline-of-forkonomy-summer-2018-e6da993ee3f9\" target=\"_blank\">Towards an Analytical Discipline of Forkonomy<\/a>\u201d and \u201c<a rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" aria-label=\"Forkonomy Revisited (opens in a new tab)\" href=\"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/towards-an-analytical-discipline-of-forkonomy-summer-2018\" target=\"_blank\">Forkonomy Revisited<\/a>\u201d and was first included in the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/what-the-forkgov-article-included-in-daostacks-decentralised-thriving-anthology\/\">Decentralised Thriving<\/a> Anthology]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator\"\/>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"twitter-tweet\" data-lang=\"en-gb\"><p dir=\"ltr\" lang=\"en\">Fork your mother if you want fork!<\/p>\u2014 Jihan Who (@JihanWho) <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/JihanWho\/status\/1086620754467323904?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw\">19 January 2019<\/a><\/blockquote>\n<script async=\"\" src=\"https:\/\/platform.twitter.com\/widgets.js\" charset=\"utf-8\"><\/script>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">First, some definitions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Forks:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In\n open source software, project codebase forks are commonplace and occur \nwhen existing software development paths diverge, creating separate and \ndistinct pieces of software. Torvalds\u2019 original Linux kernel from 1991 \nhas been forked into <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fen.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FList_of_Linux_distributions\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">countless descendant projects<\/a>. In the case of blockchain-based cryptocurrency networks implementing ledgers, there exists the prospect of both <em>codebase<\/em> and <em>ledger forks<\/em>. A cryptocurrency codebaseforkcreates\n an independent project to be launched with a new genesis block which \nmay share consensus rules but with an entirely different transaction \nhistory than its progenitor\u200a\u2014\u200ae.g. BTC and LTC. A ledger fork creates a \nseparate incompatible network, sharing its history with the progenitor \nnetwork until the divergent event, commonly referred to as a <em>chain split\u200a\u2014\u200a<\/em>e.g. BTC and BCH.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"twitter-tweet\" data-conversation=\"none\" data-lang=\"en-gb\"><p dir=\"ltr\" lang=\"en\">3\/ Fork terminology is tricky and sometimes muddled. As the concept came to cryptocurrency from OSS development many of the terms have been co-opted but there are further nuances here: particularly to distinguish between codebase \/ ledger forks, and hard \/ soft \/ velvet forks. <a href=\"https:\/\/t.co\/fh8RLjkAIk\">pic.twitter.com\/fh8RLjkAIk<\/a><\/p>\u2014 Parallel Industries \ua66e ? ? (@parallelind) <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/parallelind\/status\/1049229540021739520?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw\">8 October 2018<\/a><\/blockquote>\n<script async=\"\" src=\"https:\/\/platform.twitter.com\/widgets.js\" charset=\"utf-8\"><\/script>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Consensus\n rule changes or alteration of the network transaction history may be \nthe cause of such a fracture, deliberate or unplanned. Often when \nnetworks upgrade software, consensus rules or implement new features a \nportion of the network participants may be left behind on a vestigial \ntimeline that lacks developer, community, wallet or exchange support. In\n the summer of 2018 a fifth of nodes running Bitcoin Cash (BCH)\u200a\u2014\u200aa <em>minority ledger fork<\/em>\n of BTC with significantly relaxed block size limitations\u200a\u2014\u200awere \nseparated from the BCH network and a non-trivial number of would-be \nnodes remained disconnected from the BCH network weeks later.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Governance:<\/strong> Decision making process between multiple parties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Blockchain governance:<\/strong> Decision-making process by mutually distrusting entities in a multi-party distributed system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>On\/off-chain governance (aka governance by \/ of the network):<\/strong>\n Decisions are made either explicitly through the network\u2019s ledger and \nUTXOs\/balances possessed therein, or via some other (in)formal mechanism\n such as rough or social consensus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Read <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/cryptolawreview\/blockchain-governance-bibliography-360efc52d3f9\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">these articles<\/a> collated by <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/@cleanapp\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">CleanApp<\/a> for a detailed discussion of key considerations in formally governed blockchain networks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Immutability: <\/strong>An attribute primarily observed at the protocol layer in the <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2Fparallelind%2Fstatus%2F1086911591960985601\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">decentralised networking stack<\/a>\u200a\u2014\u200aupon\n which the monetary layer depends for persistence\u200a\u2014\u200aensuring the \ninability of stakeholders or adversaries to alter the transaction record\n and thereby balances. With this in mind, the oft-quoted concept of <em>\u2018code is law\u2019<\/em>\n which refers to immutability in cryptocurrency networks, typically \nreferring more to preserving the intended use and function of a system \nand its ledger rather than a blind adherence to a software \nimplementation regardless of flaws or vulnerabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cdn-images-1.medium.com\/max\/960\/1%2A4rbyK33PLHkMXSixvMWP5g.jpeg?w=620&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\"\/><figcaption>By Kevin Durkin for In The Mesh. Source: <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Finthemesh.com%2Farchive%2Freaching-everyone-pt-ii%2F\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/inthemesh.com\/archive\/reaching-everyone-pt-ii\/<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>What Maketh a Fork?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The\n distinction between what constitutes a vestigial network and a viable \nbreakaway faction is unclear and difficult to objectively parameterise. \nThere is a significant element of adversarial strategy, political \ngamesmanship and public signalling of (real or synthetic) intent and \nsupport via social media platforms. The notions of critical mass and \nstakeholder buy-in are ostensibly at play since ecosystem fragmentations\n would be characterised as <em>strongly negative sum <\/em>through the invocation of <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F%3A10.1109%2FMC.2013.374\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Metcalfe\u2019s Law<\/a>\n as regards network effects and hence value proposition. Any blockchain \nsecured thermodynamically by Proof-of-Work (PoW) is susceptible to \nattack vectors such as so-called <em>51 %<\/em> or <em>majority attacks<\/em>, leading to <em>re-orgs <\/em>(chain re-organisations) as multiple candidates satisfying chain selection rules emerge. These can result in the potential for <em>double-spending <\/em>the\n same funds more than once against entities such as exchanges who do not\n require sufficient confirmations for transaction finality to be \nreliable in an adversarial context. Should a network fragment into \nmultiple disconnected populations, adversaries with control of much less\n significant computational resource <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ffc18.ifca.ai%2Fbitcoin%2Fpapers%2Fbitcoin18-final17.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">would be in reach of majority hashrate<\/a> either using permanent or rented computation from sources such as Nicehash or Amazon EC3.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"twitter-tweet\" data-conversation=\"none\" data-lang=\"en-gb\"><p dir=\"ltr\" lang=\"en\">4\/ What ingredients are needed to sustain a &#8220;minority&#8221; network fragment such as <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/search?q=%24ETC&amp;src=ctag&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw\">$ETC<\/a>? For a PoW network, it&#8217;s going to need significant hashrate to avoid replay attacks, re-orgs &amp; wipeout risks &#8211; especially if <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/hashtag\/codeislaw?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw\">#codeislaw<\/a> &amp; immutability is respected. Devs, users &amp; businesses too. <a href=\"https:\/\/t.co\/G63TJHT4VP\">pic.twitter.com\/G63TJHT4VP<\/a><\/p>\u2014 Parallel Industries \ua66e ? ? (@parallelind) <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/parallelind\/status\/1049229546401292288?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw\">8 October 2018<\/a><\/blockquote>\n<script async=\"\" src=\"https:\/\/platform.twitter.com\/widgets.js\" charset=\"utf-8\"><\/script>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A\n striking example of this was the divergence of the Ethereum developer \nand leadership cadre (ETH) from the canonical account-oriented Ethereum \nblockchain (ETC) due to the <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fhackingdistributed.com%2F2016%2F05%2F27%2Fdao-call-for-moratorium.\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">exploitation of a flawed smart contract<\/a> project resembling a quasi-securitised decentralised investment fund known as <em>The DAO <\/em>(Decentralised\n Autonomous Organisation). In this case the Ethereum insiders decided to\n sacrifice immutability and by extension censorship-resistance in order \nto conduct an <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fblog.bitmex.com%2Frevisiting-the-dao\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">effective bailout of DAO participants<\/a>\n which came to exercise Too-Big-To-Fail influence over the overall \nEthereum network, insider asset holdings, token supply and mindshare. A \nsocial media consultation process in conjunction with on-chain voting \nwas employed to arrive at this conclusion though both methods are known \nto be <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fvitalik.ca%2Fgeneral%2F2017%2F12%2F17%2Fvoting.html\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">flawed and gameable<\/a>. During the <em>irregular state transition process<\/em>\n akin to a rollback, a co-ordinated effort between miners, exchanges and\n developers took place on private channels, exposing the degree of \ncentralisation inherent in the power structures of constituent network \nparticipants.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The key event which transformed the canonical Ethereum blockchain (where the DAO attacker kept their spoils) from a vestigial <em>wiped out <\/em>chain\n to a viable if contentious minority fork was the decision by Bitsquare \nand Poloniex exchanges to list the attacker\u2019s timeline as Ethereum \nClassic (ETC) alongside high-profile mining participants such as \nChandler Guo, well resourced financial organisations such as Grayscale \nInvest (a subsidiary of Digital Currency Group) and former development \nteam members such as Charles Hoskinson to publically declare and deploy \nsupport, developers and significant hashrate to <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbitcoinmagazine.com%2Farticles%2Fethereum-classic-community-navigates-a-distinct-path-to-the-future-1471620464%2F\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">defend the original Ethereum network<\/a>.\n ETC now exists as an independent and sovereign network with diverging \npriorities, characteristics and goals to the larger Ethereum network \nETH.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Forks and network governance: the case of Bitcoin and SegWit (excerpt from <\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fhackernoon.com%2Ftowards-an-analytical-discipline-of-forkonomy-summer-2018-e6da993ee3f9\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><strong>Forkonomy paper<\/strong><\/a><strong>)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For\n a range of reasons, there is often strident resistance to hard \nforks\u200a\u2014\u200airreversible protocol upgrades or relaxing of the existing \nconsensus ruleset\u200a\u2014\u200ain \u201cungoverned\u201d trust-minimised cryptocurrency \nnetworks such as BTC. The lack of controlling entities may lead to a \nchain split and lasting network partition if the delicate balance of \nstakeholder incentives fails in the presence of a divergent event. The \nimplementation of SegWit (Segregated Witness) by the BTC network was \neventually achieved in 2017 as a backward-compatible soft fork following\n several years of intense political and strategic maneuvering by the \nconstituent stakeholders in the BTC network. This off-chain governance \nprocess of emergent consensus requiring supermajority or unanimity \nmeasured by miner signalling has proven to be an <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.oii.ox.ac.uk%2Fblog%2Funderstanding-public-blockchain-governance\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">inefficient and gameable mechanism<\/a>\n for administering the BTC network. Certain stakeholder constituencies \nsuch as the developers maintaining the reference Bitcoin Core software \nclient implementation of BTC could not easily reach agreement with \nmining oligopolists and so-called big block advocates over the optimum \ntechnological trajectory for the BTC network.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Major\n stakeholders of the mining constituency strongly opposed SegWit as it \nwould render a previously clandestine proprietary efficiency advantage \nknown as <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fblog.bitmex.com%2Fgraphical-illustration-of-a-bitcoin-block\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">covert ASICBoost<\/a>\n ineffective on the canonical BTC chain. A grassroots BTC community \nmovement campaigning for a User Activated Soft Fork (UASF) for SegWit \nimplementation and a face-saving Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (<a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fbitcoin%2Fbips%2Fblob%2Fmaster%2Fbip-0091.mediawiki.\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">BIP91<\/a>)\n facilitated the eventual lock-in of the SegWit upgrade in the summer of\n 2017. A contentious network partition took place in August 2017, giving\n rise to the Bitcoin Cash (BCH) network which rejected SegWit and opted \ninstead for linear on-chain scaling. By changing the block size and \nloosening the consensus ruleset without overwhelming agreement from all \nconstituencies of the BTC network, it is difficult to find a basis for \nBCH proponents\u2019 claims to be the canonical Bitcoin blockchain without \ninvoking appeals to emotion, authority or other logical fallacies. The \ncontinuing presence of Craig S. Wright and his claims to be a progenitor\n of Bitcoin are an example of these <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.lrb.co.uk%2Fv38%2Fn13%2Fandrew-ohagan%2Fthe-satoshi-affair\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">attempts at legitimacy<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>What the #forkgov? Fork-resistance and governance<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Given\n the significant downside potential of real and perceived threats to the\n resilience and legitimacy of a fragmenting network and loss of \nassociated network effects, the ability of a blockchain-based protocol \nnetwork to demonstrate fork resistance provides significant strength to \nits value proposition and two notable examples of networks attempting to\n utilise such a mechanism are Tezos and Decred. Decred is an example of a\n hybrid PoW\/PoS monetary network which is implementing a proposal and \ngovernance mechanism termed <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fproposals.decred.org%2F\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Politeia<\/a>.\n Since coin-holders have voting rights based on stake weight, they have \nthe ability to keep miners and developer constituencies honest through \nthe mechanism to reach decisions by majority stakeholder consensus on \nmatters including hard forks. These lessons were ostensibly learned \nthrough the developer team\u2019s experiences in writing a BTC client which \nthey felt was not appraised objectively by the Bitcoin Core developer \necosystem. Decred\u2019s fork resistance is effectively achieved by the fact \nthat most stakeholders would be non-voting on a minority chain, it would\n remain stalled as blocks would not be created or propagated across the \nupstart network.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Taking\n a high-level perspective, let\u2019s address the most general question: are \nthese two notions meaningfully compatible? If we think of any natural \nprocess in the Universe\u200a\u2014\u200afrom the celestial to the tribal\u200a\u2014\u200aas \naccretions and communities grow in size and complexity, <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=http%3A%2F%2Funenumerated.blogspot.com%2F2017%2F02%2Fmoney-blockchains-and-social-scalability.html\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">scalability<\/a> challenges increase markedly. <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/tezos\/amending-tezos-b77949d97e1e\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Minimising accidental chain splits during protocol upgrades is a worthy goal.<\/a> However, <strong>denying\n a mechanism to allow factions a graceful and orderly exit has upsides \nin preserving the moat of network effect but at the cost of internal \ndissonance<\/strong>, which may grow over time and lead to <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fpdaian.com%2Fblog%2Fvote-buying-on-chain-governance-and-quadratic-plutocracy%2F\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">second-order shenanigans<\/a>. Sound familiar?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"twitter-tweet\" data-lang=\"en-gb\"><p dir=\"ltr\" lang=\"en\">BrexitCoin combines Proof-of-Flag governance and historical obfuscation so that mistakes are guaranteed to be repeated. Unelected leaders of BrexitCoin committee must wait for a scandal to occur before the next &#8220;democracyblock&#8221; may be proposed.<a href=\"https:\/\/t.co\/cNpICRxHCI\">https:\/\/t.co\/cNpICRxHCI<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/t.co\/dsgYr09UG5\">pic.twitter.com\/dsgYr09UG5<\/a><\/p>\u2014 Byzantine Business School (@BusinessSch001) <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/BusinessSch001\/status\/1003649008450097154?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw\">4 June 2018<\/a><\/blockquote>\n<script async=\"\" src=\"https:\/\/platform.twitter.com\/widgets.js\" charset=\"utf-8\"><\/script>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">One can look at ledger forks in a few different ways as good, bad or neutral:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[Good]\n A\/B\/\u2026\/Z testing of different technical, economic or philosophical \napproaches aka \u201cLet the market decide, fork freedom baby!\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[Bad] Deleterious to network effects of nascent currency protocols with respect to <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fen.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FMetcalfe%2527s_law\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Metcalfe<\/a> or (IMO much more relevant) <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fpapers.ssrn.com%2Fsol3%2Fpapers.cfm%3Fabstract_id%3D3281845\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">transactome-informed network capital theory<\/a> as discussed by Gogerty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[Neutral]\n An inevitability of entropy and\/or finite social scalability as these \nnetworks grow and mature it is not realistic to keep all stakeholders \nsufficiently aligned for optimal network health.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As\n such, protocol layer fork resistance and effective public fora with \nvoting mechanisms can certainly be helpful tools, but there is a \nquestion as to whether democracy (<em>the tyranny of the majority<\/em>)\n should be exercised in all cases. If there was a \u201cblock size\u201d style \ncivil war in Tezos or Decred with no acceptable compromise in sight, \nwould the status quo still be the best situation in all cases?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"twitter-tweet\" data-lang=\"en-gb\"><p dir=\"ltr\" lang=\"en\">Worth noting that I predicted the first Tezos hard fork over a year ago (<a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/tzlibre?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw\">@tzlibre<\/a>)?.<br><br>There is *nothing* that supercedes fork-based governance for cryptocurrencies, and that is a good thing. <a href=\"https:\/\/t.co\/E0jRomnvqi\">https:\/\/t.co\/E0jRomnvqi<\/a><\/p>\u2014 Philip Daian (@phildaian) <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/phildaian\/status\/1047890841338044416?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw\">4 October 2018<\/a><\/blockquote>\n<script async=\"\" src=\"https:\/\/platform.twitter.com\/widgets.js\" charset=\"utf-8\"><\/script>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">My\n perspective is that fork-resistance will largely redistribute the \nmanifestations of discontent rather than provide a lasting cure to ills,\n and the native network governance mechanisms <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fasymmetries.pllel.com\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">may be gamed by either incumbents or ousters<\/a>.\n More time is needed to see how decision-making regarding technical \nevolution unfolds in both networks. Decred seems to be sitting pretty \nwith a <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/@richardred\/the-role-of-decred-voters-in-defending-against-majority-attacks-ec658af0a8fd\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">fairly attack-resilient hybrid PoW\/PoS system<\/a>,\n but there are some \u201cexclusionary forces\u201d in the network leading to the \nescalating DCR-denominated costs of staking tickets necessary to receive\n PoS rewards and participate in proposal voting, denying access to the \nmechanism to smaller holders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Demand\n for tickets and staking rewards naturally increases with ongoing \nissuance, as the widening pool of coin holders wanting to mitigate \ndilution also does. As the <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.decred.org%2Fproof-of-stake%2Fproof-of-stake%2F\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">ticket price is dynamic and demand-responsive<\/a>,\n it creates upwards pressure which would make tickets inaccessible for a\n growing proportion of coin holders. At time of writing, \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/decred\/dcr-ticket-splitting-all-you-need-to-know-b8edc6b65db3\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">ticket splitting<\/a>\u201d\n allowing smaller holders to engage in PoS is available from some stake \npools and self-organised collectives but the process is not yet \nautomated in reference clients. On the other hand, the ongoing bear \nmarket has seen the USD ticket price fall from ~$8\u201310k USD at January \nand May 2018 peaks to ~$2k USD today in late January 2019 so those \nentering Decred with capital from outside the cryptocurrency domain \nwould likely be undeterred. Data from <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dcrdata.org\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">dcrdata.org<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.coincap.io\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">coincap.io<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cdn-images-1.medium.com\/max\/960\/1%2ApGKjkQ18bAI5uHVca0564g.png?w=620&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\"\/><figcaption>50 day moving average of DCR staking ticket prices. Source: <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fexplorer.dcrdata.org%2Fcharts%23ticket-price\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/explorer.dcrdata.org\/charts#ticket-price<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Further, as per Parallel Industries\u2019 <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pllel.com%2Findustries%2Fproject-update-classification-approaches-for-cryptographic-assets%2F\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">TokenSpace taxonomy research<\/a>,\n staking rewards resemble dividends and token-based governance \nprivileges resemble shareholder rights which make Decred appear a little\n closer to the traditional definition of a <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fjpm.iijournals.com%2Fcontent%2F23%2F2%2F86\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">capital asset<\/a>\n than pure PoW systems. This may or may not be an issue depending how \nregulation unfolds. Tezos has those potential issues plus the regulatory\n risk from the token sale. Decred\u2019s airdrop may not have distributed the\n coin as fairly as possible but will undoubtedly attract a lower \ncompliance burden than a token sale or premine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u201cActivist Forks\u201d &amp; \u201cUnfounder Forks\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Can\n you appreciate the technology utility but dislike the economic, human \nand compliance issues packaged together with a project?<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Taking this a step further, these dissonant groups may conduct a <em>guerilla<\/em>\n campaign inside a network to focus attention on their cause. Last \nsummer, a few anti-KYC factions of Tezos had appeared on social media \noutlets prior to network launch, however since the mainnet launch things\n have quietened down somewhat. One faction which still apparently \nintends to create a fork of Tezos changed tact and became a <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/r\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2Ftzlibre%2Fstatus%2F1014850588901888000\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">delegated staker<\/a> within the network whilst continuing to voice dissent\u200a\u2014\u200aperhaps this \u201c<em>fork activism<\/em>\u201d can be interpreted as a response to the \u201cfork-resistance\u201d of Tezos.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"twitter-tweet\" data-conversation=\"none\" data-lang=\"en-gb\"><p dir=\"ltr\" lang=\"en\">No-one is being fooled by high-friction Futility tokens. <a href=\"https:\/\/t.co\/NHikROquE8\">https:\/\/t.co\/NHikROquE8<\/a><\/p>\u2014 Parallel Industries \ua66e ? ? (@parallelind) <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/parallelind\/status\/1058427148434898945?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw\">2 November 2018<\/a><\/blockquote>\n<script async=\"\" src=\"https:\/\/platform.twitter.com\/widgets.js\" charset=\"utf-8\"><\/script>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So, what else could a fork activist do? Take a look around at the ongoing ICO <em>bonfire of the vanities<\/em> which is largely due to poorly thought out sales of high-friction <em>futility tokens<\/em>\n infringing upon \/ attempting to circumvent various regulations around \nthe world. The prospect of removing the token issuers and the tokens \nthemselves once treasuries are liquidated (by themselves, or by \nlawmakers) and development ceases is quite attractive indeed\u200a\u2014\u200awill we \nsee a wave of \u201c<em>unfounder forks<\/em>\u201d as in <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/hydro-protocol\/why-we-are-forking-0x-97dc48ee0426\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">this example<\/a>? Perhaps operating in reverse to <a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/@simondlr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Simon de la Rouviere<\/a>\u2019s \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/@simondlr\/burning-bridges-to-greener-grass-incentivizing-tokenized-forking-393c69dfecab\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Tokenised Forking<\/a>\u201d where <em>both <\/em>tokens and founders are excised.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"twitter-tweet\" data-lang=\"en-gb\"><p dir=\"ltr\" lang=\"en\">Been thinking about this, started already and will only happen more from here &#8211; &#8220;activist&#8221; or &#8220;unfounder&#8221; forks if you will.<br><br>Let the ICO vendors bear legal risk &amp; develop, then remove the token friction &amp; promoters upon launch\/runway expiry.<a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/hashtag\/forkonomy?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw\">#forkonomy<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/t.co\/7LpZvpbQhc\">https:\/\/t.co\/7LpZvpbQhc<\/a><\/p>\u2014 Parallel Industries \ua66e ? ? (@parallelind) <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/parallelind\/status\/1086915376485666816?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw\">20 January 2019<\/a><\/blockquote>\n<script async=\"\" src=\"https:\/\/platform.twitter.com\/widgets.js\" charset=\"utf-8\"><\/script>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"> <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Fork-governance of cryptocurrencies and decentralised networks examined [Note: This text written in January 2019 follows on from \u201cTowards an Analytical Discipline of Forkonomy\u201d and \u201cForkonomy Revisited\u201d and was first included in the Decentralised Thriving Anthology] Fork your mother if you want fork! \u2014 Jihan Who (@JihanWho) 19 January 2019 First, some definitions. Forks: In open &hellip; <a href=\"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/what-the-forkgov-does-staying-together-tear-you-apart-even-more\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">What the ForkGov! Does staying together tear you apart even more?<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_hide_featured_image":false,"_jetpack_featured_image_duplicate_dismissed":0,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[1],"tags":[17,15,12],"class_list":["post-755","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-articles","tag-daosanddonts","tag-forkonomy","without-featured-image"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p9ARiU-cb","jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":696,"url":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/what-the-forkgov-article-included-in-daostacks-decentralised-thriving-anthology\/","url_meta":{"origin":755,"position":0},"title":"&#8220;What The #ForkGov&#8221; article included in DAOStack&#8217;s &#8220;Decentralised Thriving&#8221; Anthology","author":"pllel","date":"11\/04\/2019","format":false,"excerpt":"Wassim's \"What The #ForkGov\" article exploring fork-based governance of decentralised networks has been included in DAOStack's \"Decentralised Thriving\" Anthology. Download it from here.","rel":"","context":"In \"Articles\"","block_context":{"text":"Articles","link":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/tag\/articles\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-content\/uploads\/Screenshot-from-2019-04-11-16-22-56.png?resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-content\/uploads\/Screenshot-from-2019-04-11-16-22-56.png?resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-content\/uploads\/Screenshot-from-2019-04-11-16-22-56.png?resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-content\/uploads\/Screenshot-from-2019-04-11-16-22-56.png?resize=700%2C400 2x"},"classes":[]},{"id":83,"url":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/project-update-forkonomy-aka-blockchains-time-travel\/","url_meta":{"origin":755,"position":1},"title":"Project Update: Forkonomy aka Blockchains &#038; Time Travel","author":"pllel","date":"01\/11\/2018","format":false,"excerpt":"Since summer 2018, Wassim has been working on an unusual topic and has produced some talks and papers (manuscript as PDF \/\/ read on Medium \/\/ read on this site) introducing an analogical method that's been called \"forkonomy\". Just like astronomy takes observations from stellar sources at different phases of\u2026","rel":"","context":"In \"Forkonomy\"","block_context":{"text":"Forkonomy","link":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/tag\/forkonomy\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-content\/uploads\/DohWOpGXkAEc5oq.jpg?resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200},"classes":[]},{"id":139,"url":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wassim-speaks-at-the-ethereum-classic-summit-in-seoul-on-september-12-13\/","url_meta":{"origin":755,"position":2},"title":"Forkonomy and Reaching Everyone head to the Ethereum Classic Summit in Seoul Sep 2018","author":"pllel","date":"01\/09\/2018","format":false,"excerpt":". Wassim speaks at the Ethereum Classic Summit in Seoul, Korea on September 12-13. In addition to a presentation on implications of Forkonomy for ETC, Wassim will also participate in a panel discussion on the topic of censorship resistance and immutability as informed by Reaching Everyone. More information can be\u2026","rel":"","context":"In \"Events\"","block_context":{"text":"Events","link":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/tag\/events\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/09\/etcsummitheader-300x169.jpg?resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200},"classes":[]},{"id":660,"url":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/crypto-valley-sessions-in-zug-switzerland-may-2019\/","url_meta":{"origin":755,"position":3},"title":"Crypto Valley Sessions in Zug, Switzerland May 2019","author":"pllel","date":"24\/03\/2019","format":false,"excerpt":"Wassim will be taking workshops and talks based on three Parallel Industries projects to Crypto Valley VC Labs in Zug, Switzerland in mid-May 2019. Forkonomy, DAOs and Don'ts and TokenSpace roadtrip upcoming, some sessions will be open to public attendance. More information here.","rel":"","context":"In \"DAOsandDont's\"","block_context":{"text":"DAOsandDont's","link":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/tag\/daosanddonts\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-content\/uploads\/cvvcwassim.jpeg?resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-content\/uploads\/cvvcwassim.jpeg?resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-content\/uploads\/cvvcwassim.jpeg?resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-content\/uploads\/cvvcwassim.jpeg?resize=700%2C400 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-content\/uploads\/cvvcwassim.jpeg?resize=1050%2C600 3x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-content\/uploads\/cvvcwassim.jpeg?resize=1400%2C800 4x"},"classes":[]},{"id":554,"url":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wassim-on-lets-talk-etc-podcast-sep-18\/","url_meta":{"origin":755,"position":4},"title":"Wassim on &#8220;Let&#8217;s Talk ETC&#8221; Podcast (Autumn 2018)","author":"pllel","date":"16\/02\/2019","format":false,"excerpt":"Recently re-uploaded to our YouTube Channel is a conversation Wassim had with Prof. Christian Seberino of Let's Talk ETC podcast, following his appearance at the 2018 Ethereum Classic Summit. Among the topics covered were Wassim's background, Forkonomy as an analytical lens to understand possible futures of blockchain-archtected networks and the\u2026","rel":"","context":"In \"Forkonomy\"","block_context":{"text":"Forkonomy","link":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/tag\/forkonomy\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":513,"url":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/article-forkonomy-revisited-where-are-they-now\/","url_meta":{"origin":755,"position":5},"title":"Forkonomy Revisited: Where Are They Now?","author":"pllel","date":"31\/01\/2019","format":false,"excerpt":"51% of a year has passed, let\u2019s check back in on our plucky and hopeful minority networks. [Note: This is a follow-up commentary after the original\u00a0Forkonomy\u00a0paper (now on\u00a0Hacker Noon) was written and self-published on\u00a0pllel.com\u00a0in summer 2018 with\u00a0last revision 10th August. Figures come from\u00a0#forkonomy tweets, original manuscript and presentation slides from\u00a0ETC\u2026","rel":"","context":"In \"Articles\"","block_context":{"text":"Articles","link":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/tag\/articles\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]}],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/755","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=755"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/755\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":761,"href":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/755\/revisions\/761"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=755"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=755"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.pllel.com\/industries\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=755"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}